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Behavioral economic theory conceptualizes human behavior as the result of 
allocating behavioral resources to engage in preferred activities. This framework has been 
applied sparingly to gambling behavior. The present study sought to reveal the important 
behavioral economic construct of relative reinforcing value for the activity of gambling 
by manipulating the value of an alternative reinforcer as well as constraining it’s 
availability in a sample of college students, a population that consistently shows elevated 
rates of gambling as well as problematic gambling behaviors. Analyses did not support 
the hypotheses, as gambling’s reinforcing value was not demonstrated by the 
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Applying a Behavioral Economic Framework to the Gambling Behavior of College 
Students 
An extensive literature comprising animal and human subjects in experimental 
and applied studies supports a behavioral economic model for alcohol and other drug use 
behavior (Murphy, MacKillop, Vuchinich, & Tucker 2011; Vuchinich & Tucker, 1988). 
A small yet expanding body of literature conceptualizes gambling behavior in a 
behavioral economic framework (Madden, Francisco, Brewer, & Stein, 2011). Those 
who adopt this approach assert that people place subjective values on reinforcers, and 
choose to allocate behavioral resources to attain those reinforcers. Behavioral economics 
is concerned with this valuation process and how people choose the behaviors they 
engage in (Kahneman, 2003).  This focus has proven valuable in the understanding of 
addictive behavior (Murphy et al., 2011). Considering gambling within a behavioral 
economic framework should help us to understand why people choose to gamble over 
other lower risk activities and potentially inform prevention and intervention efforts 
aimed at lowering reinforcement derived from gambling (Higgins, Heil, & Lussier, 
2004). The purpose of the present study was to seek evidence supporting the utility of a 
behavioral economic view of gambling behavior.  Adapting an experimental design taken 
from Vuchinich and Tucker (1983), we examined whether increasing the value of an 
alternative reinforcer would decrease gambling’s reinforcing value, and if increasing the 
constraints on an alternative reinforcer would increase the value of gambling. 
Borrowing from the field of economics, behavioral economics views individuals 
as consumers of behavior. In this sense, people choose to allocate time, money, and other 
resources to a range of possible activities by engaging in a process of weighing the costs 
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and benefits of the available alternatives. As the perceived costs begin to outweigh 
perceived benefits, preference shifts. As the law of demand predicts, price increases lead 
to a decrease in consumption or occurrence of a behavior. This decrease in consumption 
is manifested in the shape of a decelerating curve (Murphy & MacKillop, 2006). 
Behavioral economics also takes a molar view of behavior in that it does not attempt to 
predict what choices people make in a specific context, but rather looks at the accrual of 
behaviors over time. A behavior becomes preferred over a range of alternatives when the 
behavior is perceived as having higher reinforcing value than the alternatives. This notion 
of relative reinforcing value (Murphy & MacKillop, 2006) has been an important 
construct in the addictions literature and has often been operationalized in laboratory 
studies as the amount of work (e.g, lever presses) reinforcers elicited and the relative 
amount of the substance consumed compared to the alternative (Higgins et al., 2004).  
This relativity of reinforcing behavior is best explicated by Herrnstein’s Matching 
Law (1970). Hernsteinn asserted that the occurrence of a certain behavior compared to its 
alternatives is equal to the amount of reinforcement or reinforcing value derived from the 
corresponding behavior and its alternatives. That is, directly relative rates of behavior 
will match relative rates of reinforcement. In this way, behavioral output is a “zero-sum” 
game; engaging in one behavior necessarily changes how much one can engage in all 
other available behaviors. 
In behavioral economic theory three key factors impact reinforcing value and the 
prediction of behavior: 1) the availability of a reinforcer, 2) the availability of alternative 
reinforcers, and 3) temporal delay to a reinforcer or its alternatives (Vuchinich & Tucker, 
1988). Constraints on access to reinforcers influence their relative reinforcing value. 
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Generally, when a reinforcer is directly constrained, the cost of obtaining it increases, 
leading to a decrease in resources allocated to obtain it and a lower relative reinforcing 
value. Alternatively, relieving the constraints on access to a reinforcer will drive up 
relative reinforcing value because of the lowered cost of reinforcer obtainment. However, 
individual differences temper this facet of reinforcing value. That is, demand can be 
relatively elastic, and sensitive to escalating price, or relatively inelastic, and resistant to 
escalating price. Additionally, when constraints are placed on alternative reinforcers, 
resources will be less likely to be allocated to them (Vuchinich & Tucker, 1983).  
Temporal delays to a reinforcer also impact relative reinforcement value. 
Generally, as time to the reception of a reinforcer increases, subjective value of that 
reinforcer decreases. This concept is also referred to as delay discounting (Bickel & 
Marsh, 2001). A review of delay discounting and gambling studies consistently found 
that gamblers, compared to controls, preferred smaller, more immediate rewards over 
larger, later rewards (Madden et al., 2011). 
Considerable evidence exists for the influence of alternative, nondrug reinforcers 
on consumption of drugs. Higgins and colleagues (2004) extensively reviewed laboratory 
studies with human participants that demonstrate the flexibility of the reinforcing effects 
of cocaine, nicotine, and alcohol. Across substances, consumption has been shown to be 
affected by constraints on their availability as well as the availability of alternatives. 
Specifically, introducing a monetary alternative to cocaine reduced the amount of the 
drug consumed by human participants (Higgins, Bickel, & Hughes, 1994). Additionally, 
crack cocaine users given the opportunity to keep money or allocate it to acquire doses of 
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the inhaled drug. As the amount of money increased, less was allocated to the drug 
(Hatsukami, Thompson, Pentel, Flygare, & Carroll, 1994). 
Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) demonstrated the amenability of alcohol use to a 
behavioral economics model by offering participants the choice, on a button pressing 
task, to select one of two potential reinforcers with differing temporal delays. On a 
variable interval schedule participants were either given a choice to work for money in 
increments of 2 cents or 10 cents or alcohol held constant at increments of 1/20
th
 of a 
drink. An additional manipulation of temporal delay to the monetary reinforcer was set at 
immediate receipt of money, a 2-week delay, or an 8-week delay. With the proportion of 
responses allocated to acquiring alcohol as the dependent variable, the investigators 
found that as the monetary award increased, responding for alcohol decreased, and as 
delay to receiving money increased, responding for alcohol increased. These findings 
demonstrated the explicative value of behavioral economic theory with alcohol choice. 
Given that gambling is risking money or something of value on an unknown 
outcome, choice behavior and weighing risks are necessarily involved. It is ironic then 
that gambling behavior has not been investigated in this theoretical framework to the 
extent of other addictive behaviors. The extant literature focuses almost exclusively on 
the behavioral economic concept of delay discounting (Madden et al., 2011).  
Although a common recreational activity that is culturally acceptable (Whelan, 
Steenbergh, & Meyers, 2007), gambling can be particularly problematic. Pathological 
gambling is “persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts 
personal, family, or vocational pursuits” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Past 
year gambling prevalence rates for college students range from 42% (LaBrie, Shaffer, 
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LaPlante, & Wechsler, 2003) to 75% (Barnes, Welte, Hoffman, & Tidwell, 2010). A 
sample more representative of the US population had a past year gambling prevalence 
rate of 82% (Welte, Barnes, Wieczorek, & Tidwell, 2004). In a meta-analysis of 
prevalence studies, Shaffer and Hall (2001) found lifetime pathological gambling rates of 
3.4% for adolescents, 1.9% for adults, and 5.6% for college students. More recent meta-
analyses suggest rates of pathological gambling in college students range from 3% to 
32% with a median of 8.7%, a rate much higher than the adult population (Nowak & 
Aloe, 2013).   Among college students, 18.3% of men and 4.4% of women were found to 
be problem or pathological gamblers (Engwall, Hunter, & Steinberg, 2004). 
College student gamblers are at a high risk for developing other co-occurring 
behavioral problems. Problem and pathological student gamblers compared to other 
students reported binge eating and heavier drinking with more negative consequenes 
(Engwall et al., 2004). Problem gambling among college students also correlates with 
high-risk behaviors such as alcohol and other drug use and risky sexual behaviors. 
(Stuldreher, Stuhldreher, & Forres, 2007).  
Given the impact of problem gambling, especially among adolescents and young 
adults, we adapted the Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) methodology to examine college 
student gambling within the framework of behavioral economics. Based on prior work 
with alcohol, we expected that preference for gambling would be influenced by the 
reinforcement value and time delay of alternatives. We hypothesized that as the 
reinforcing value of a gambling alternative increases, the reinforcing value for gambling 
will decrease. Secondly, as the temporal delay to the alternative behavior increased, the 





 The sample was comprised of 84 participants recruited from a state university 
undergraduate subject pool who were at least 18 years of age. Of the participants, 62% 
were female and the average age was 22 years (SD = 6.4 years). Approximately 49% of 
the sample was African American, 37% Caucasian, 7% Asian, 5% Hispanic, and 2% of 
participants identified as “Other.” Participants’ selection of “Other” was not related to 
gambling behavior. 
Measures 
Demographic Questionnaire. A brief demographics questionnaire was 
administered to assess age, gender, and ethnicity. Other areas of assessment included 
whether or not the participant found gambling to be an acceptable/permissible behavior, 
and a measure of gambling activity preference (Dandurand, 1990). 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS). This 20-item self-report questionnaire 
assesses pathological gambling during the past year (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). 
Participants who endorsed gambling behavior in the past year were invited to participate 
in this study. Participants who scored 0 to 4 were classified as non-PG, and participants 
who scored 5 or higher were classified as pathological gamblers. In other psychometric 
studies with adult and treatment seeking samples, internal consistency was good to 
excellent (α = .86-.97), test-retest reliability was adequate (r = .71), and convergent 
validity was demonstrated with clinician-administered interviews (r = .86; Lesieur & 
Blume, 1987).  
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National Opinion Research Center Diagnosis Screen (NODS). The NODS 
(Toce-Gerstein, Gestein, & Volberg, 2003) was developed utilizing the diagnostic criteria 
for Pathological Gambling (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Designed for 
population-based surveys rather than clinical samples of problem gamblers, the NODS 
was found to be sensitive for identifying pathological gambling in a general respondent 
sample of individuals aged 18 years and older (Toce-Gerstein et al., 2003). A score of 0-2 
indicates no gambling problems.  A score of 3 to 4 indicates subclinical, or at-risk 
pathological gambling.  Five or greater equates to meeting diagnostic criteria for 
pathological gambling.  In a sample of treatment seeking problem gamblers, the NODS 
had an internal reliability of alpha= 0.79 and to have a two to four week test-retest 
reliability of 0.98. It detects problem gambling in 95% of individuals receiving treatment 
for problem gambling (Toce-Gerstein, Gerstein & Volberg, 2003).   
Delay Discounting Task – Short Form (DDT). The DDT (Amlung & 
MacKillop, 2011) is a multi-item choice procedure contrasting hypothetical smaller 
immediate monetary rewards and larger delayed monetary rewards. Preference was 
measured over 66 items and yields an index of impulsivity, a parameter, k. This 
parameter is part of a hyperbolic discounting function (Mazur, 1987): V = A / (1 + kD). 
The DDT is considered an index of impulsive decision-making, separate but related to 
two other broad categories of impulsivity measurements: personality-based indicies and 
behavioral assays of response inhibition (de Wit, 2009; Perry, Larson, German, Madden, 
& Carroll, 2005) 
Gamblers Belief Questionnaire (GBQ). The GBQ (Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & 
Whelan, 2002) is a self-report measure designed to assess gambling-related irrational 
8 
 
beliefs. The GBQ consists of 21 gambling-related irrational belief statements for which 
respondents are asked to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree on a 7-point 
Likert-type scale. The GBQ score is the sum of all items. Scores can range from 20 to 
140, with higher scores indicative of higher levels of gambling-related irrational thinking. 
Both reliability and validity data supported our use of this instrument (Steenbergh et al., 
2002).  
Measurement of Preference 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions created by 
manipulations in money amount (two levels) and temporal delay (three levels). The 
dependent variable was proportion of responses allocated to gambling vs. money. Each 
participant was given the task of responding on a simple button pressing task to earn 
either individual spins on a slot machine to be used that day or two small amounts of 
money. Money was available either in increments of 5 cents or 25 cents and the temporal 
delay to receive the money was no delay, 2 weeks or 8 weeks. Due to the logistical and 
ethical barriers of providing all participants with earned money and gambling 
opportunities, deception was employed. Participants were compensated with snacks 
provided after the experimental task and debriefing were complete. 
The button pressing task was patterned after the task employed by Vuchinich and 
Tucker (1983). Participants choose either money or gambling and then engaged in a 
button-pressing task with points delivered on a variable interval (VI) 20-second schedule 
of reinforcement. Points were accumulated for the selected reinforcer, either money or 
gambling spins.  All technical and visual aspects of Vuchinich and Tucker’s operant 
console were replicated in software designed for this study but the participant performed 
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on a laptop rather than a console. A counter and two labels appeared in each lateral half 
of the upper third of the console. In the center of the screen is a black button labeled 
‘Gambling/Money,’ and centered in the lower third of the screen is a red button labeled 
‘Gambling,’ or ‘Money,’ depending on which counter was activated in the initial choice. 
One counter registered points earned for spins on a slot machine and the other 
counter registered points earned for money. Only one counter could be activated at a 
time, with the label under the activated counter illuminated in green. The red button at the 
bottom of the screen was labeled with the corresponding activated counter. Participants 
earned points on the activated counter by clicking on the red button. At any time they 
could switch to the alternative counter by clicking the black button. The label below each 
counter explained the relationships: “When the bottom button says, ‘Gambling,’ (or 
‘Money’) clicking on it will earn points on this counter for spins on a slot machine (or 
money).” The label next to each counter specified the value of each point. The gambling 
counter label, which was the same for all subjects read, “Each point on this counter is 
worth a spin on the slot machine, which can result in wins up to $10, which you receive 
today.” The money counter label was dependent on the participants’ treatment condition. 
It read, “Each point on this counter is worth 5¢ (or 25¢), that you will receive today (or in 
2 weeks, or in 8 weeks).” The present study used 5¢ and 25¢ increments to account for 
inflation since Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) originally conducted their study. 
Delivery of the points on either counter was on a VI 20-second schedule of 
reinforcement. The label below the left counter is illuminated green at the start of the task 
for all participants. Half of the participants had the gambling counter on the left, while 
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the other half had it on the right. The computer program kept track of the number of red 
button presses on each counter and the number of switches between counters. 
Procedure 
 Participants were shown slot machines in a room adjacent to the testing room. In 
the testing room, they were consented and a basic assessment of current alcohol 
intoxication, tobacco use, and medications was administered followed by questionnaires. 
Following the consent and assessment processes, participants were seated in front of the 
laptop with the experimental program (Appendix) and given task instructions. 
Participants were told they would receive the earned money immediately after the 
experimental session, in 2 weeks, or 8 weeks, dependent on the condition. The delay 
conditions of 2 and 8 weeks were explained as a processing requirement of the university. 
Participants were further instructed that “not every red button press will produce a point 
on the counter,” but the true nature of the schedule of reinforcement was not divulged. 
The program was demonstrated by the experimenter and the participants instructed to test 
out the program in order to familiarize themselves with the procedure. Finally, they were 
encouraged to press the red and black buttons as often as they wanted during the 20 
minute session regardless of the choices they made during the task.  
After completion of the experimental task, the experimenter debriefed the 
participants, informing them of the unfortunate yet necessary deceptive nature of the 








 Past year gambling as measured by the SOGS frequency table indicated 47 
participants (56% of the sample) reported past year gambling. Of those participants, 34 
(73%) were female. The average SOGS score for the sample was 1.06 (SD = 2.75). Six 
participants (7%) scored ≥ 5 on the SOGS, indicating probable pathological gambling. 
The average NODS score for the sample was less than one (M = 0.94, SD = 2.38). Five 
participants (6%) met DSM-IV criteria for pathological gambling, as measured by ≥ 5 on 
the NODS. Two participants (3%) were classified as subclinical pathological gamblers 
(NODS score = 3 – 4).  
Preliminary Analyses 
 ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between proportion of presses for 
gambling as a function of past year gambling severity. SOGS-classified non-gamblers 
and non-pathological gamblers (M = .37, SD = .27) did not differ from probable 
pathological gamblers (M = .54, SD = .33), F(1,79) = 1.85, p  = .178, and NODS-
classified pathological gamblers (M = .50, SD = .41) did not differ from at-risk gamblers 
(M = .37, SD = .16) or non-gamblers (M = .38, SD = .27), F(2,78) = .45, p = .639.  
 Participants that reported having gambled in a casino (M = .41, SD = .28) did not 
have a significantly different proportion of presses for gambling compared to those who 
either had not gambled in a casino or did not gamble (M = .36, SD = .28), t (82) = .59, p = 
.56. 
 Demographic variables’ relations to the proportion of presses for gambling were 
also assessed. Age did not correlate significantly with proportion of presses for gambling 
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(r = .02, p = .87), nor was there a correspondence with ethnicity, F(4,80) = 1.96, p = .127. 
Additionally, measures of past-year gambling severity and a measure of gambling-related 
cognitive distortions did not correlate significantly with the proportion of presses for 
gambling (SOGS, r = .11, p = .32; NODS, r = .02, p = .83; GBQ, r = .12, p = .26). The 
SOGS and NODS correlated significantly (r = .42, p < .01), with SOGS scores also being 
significantly related to the impulsivity index scores yielded by the Delay Discounting 
Task (DDT) (r = .30, p = .01). DDT impulsivity index scores were not significantly 
related to the proportion of presses for gambling (r = .02, p = .88). 
Preference Analysis 
In order to test main hypotheses of the reinforcing value of gambling changing 
due to manipulations of the relative value of alternatives and temporal delay, 
respectively, a 2 x 3 (Money x Delay) ANOVA was conducted, with proportion of button 
presses for gambling as the dependent variable.  
The main effect for delay was not statistically significant, F(2,84) = .317 , p = 
.73, and the main effect for  money’s relative value was also not statistically significant 
F(1,84) = .565, p = .46 (see Table 1). The interaction effect of the alternative’s relative 
value and delay was not statistically significant, F(2,84) = 0.494 , p = .61 (see Table 1). 
Effect sizes for the interaction, delay, and alternative’s relative value were .013, .008, and 
.007, respectively – indicating small effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). 
Because the dependent variable comprised proportions of responses, data was not 
normally distributed, but rather occurred over a large proportion of the percentage scale. 
An arcsine transformation was performed on the data prior to a follow-up analysis of 
variance (Bartlett, 1936). The main effect for delay was not statistically significant, 
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F(2,84) = 0.255, p = .78, and the main effect for  the alternative’s relative value was also 
not statistically significant F(1,84) = 0.268, p = .61. The interaction effect of the 
alternative’s relative value and delay was not statistically significant, F(2,84) = 0.433, p 
= .65. (See Table 2). Effect sizes for the interaction, delay, and alternative’s relative 
value were .011, .006, and .003, respectively – indicating small effect sizes (Cohen, 
1988). 
Additional analyses were conducted on the groups by manipulation. An 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare proportion of presses for gambling 
for 5 cents (M = .41, SD = .30) and 25 cents (M = .36, SD = .25; t (82) = .763, p = .45, 
two-tailed) conditions. There was no significant difference in scores for 5 cents and 25 
cents. A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the 
impact of delay on proportion of presses for gambling. There was no statistical difference 
for the three groups: F (2, 82) = .323, p = .73.  
Discussion 
The present study sought to demonstrate the behavioral economic properties of 
gambling in a sample of college students. Several experimental conditions were created 
by manipulating the relative value of an alternative reinforcer through changing value and 
temporal delay. The hypothesized differences between groups were not supported by the 
data. Participants did not prefer gambling to a monetary alternative even when that value 
increased from 5cents to 25cents nor did they amend their preference as the time to 
delivery of money increased, thus supporting the null hypothesis.  
Given the extant literature on the behavioral economics of gambling, support for 
the null hypothesis is surprising. Though no published studies have sought to elicit the 
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relative reinforcing value of gambling, evidence of its existence was shown in a recent 
meta-analysis that found pathological gamblers to consistently discount delayed rewards 
in similar ways to clinical populations with various addictive diagnoses (MacKillop et al. 
2011). Also unexpected were the nonsignificant relationships between proportion of 
presses for gambling and gambling behavior, a behavioral economic index of impulsivity, 
and a measure of gambling-related cognitive distortions.  
These data are inconsistent with previous work on gambling and behavioral 
economics, and are inconsistent with the Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) study on the 
behavioral economics of alcohol. Increasing the value of an alternative to gambling did 
not decrease the value of gambling. The present findings can be interpreted one of two 
ways. First, the results may be an anomalous artifact of the extant literature due to 
methodological issues and/or sample characteristics. The second interpretation holds that 
gambling is not subject to behavioral economic principles in the ways demonstrated by 
other addictive behaviors.  
Taken in the context of the first interpretation, the study’s results question our 
investigation of gambling and its relation to behavioral economic constructs. In the 
present study, the reinforcing facets of gambling may not have been represented by spins 
on a slot machine. Instead, asking participants to press a button to accrue either small 
amounts of money to be used for gambling or small amounts of money to be received 
may be a better operationalization of preference for gambling. Additionally, the small 
amounts of money used as the alternative reinforcer may have rendered the delay to 
receiving the hypothetical amount inconsequential. Also contributing to this 
interpretation are sample characteristics. MacKillop et al.’s 2011 meta-analysis of delay 
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reward discounting across addictive diagnoses included ten studies of gambling behavior. 
Nine of those studies compared clinical samples to healthy controls, with all finding 
pathological gamblers discounting delayed rewards more steeply than the controls. Not 
only was the sample non-clinical, but the college student participants gambled at a much 
lower rate than has been reported for the population (Nowak & Aloe, 2013). Finally, 
while participants in this study had an average age above 21, some participants may not 
have had the opportunity to gamble in establishments with slot machines, potentially 
reducing the reinforcing value of gambling.  
A second interpretation of the results is that gambling behavior differs from other 
addictive behaviors by not complying with behavioral economic principles. This 
possibility suggests that gambling’s reinforcing value is not affected by a monetary 
alternative changing in value, nor by its temporal delay. Such an interpretation is not 
convergent with the gambling literature which reveals that gamblers hold these valuations 
(Madden et al., 2011). Additionally, impulsivity as measured by delay discounting is a 
hallmark of addictive behavior (de Wit, 2009). Given the state of our understanding of 
gambling behavior and behavioral economics, study design and operationalizing the 
target behavior are more likely responsible for these findings than an underlying 
discrepancy between gambling behavior and behavioral economics. 
Limitations of the study include a lack of a manipulation check performed after 
participants completed the experimental task, leaving open the possibility that 
experimental groups did not perceive meaningful differences in their conditions. 
Additionally, the low gambling problem severity of the sample and the relatively high 
number of females’ gambling limits generalizations to more general populations. The 
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study may also have been affected by an insufficient number of participants to detect a 
true difference between groups. A power analysis performed before data collection 
revealed a sample size of 82 to be necessary to detect a moderate effect size, though with 
the present design, additional participants may be necessary for that benchmark. Finally, 
the increments of 5 and 25 used may have been too small for participants to perceive as a 
reinforcing alternative to gambling. 
A challenge to conducting behavioral economic research on gambling lies in the 
framework of the empirical literature of other addictive substances. The long history of 
psychological experimentation on addictive behaviors allowed investigators to model 
methods and apparatuses after those used with animals that labored for drug 
administrations and benign alternatives. Researchers have evaluated the behavioral 
effects of nictotine, alcohol, and opiate by identifying specific units of the relevant 
substance such as a defined alcoholic drink (Jacobs & Bickel, 1999; Murphy & 
MacKillop, 2006). Often times the amounts have been accepted quantities (one puff of a 
cigarette, one alcoholic drink). Does our use of “one spin on a slot machine that can win 
up to $10” provide the reinforcement for a gambler? Future directions should take into 
account the challenges of conducting gambling research in such a framework and the 
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Means and Standard Deviations of Proportion of Presses for Spins on a Slot Machine 
   Delay condition 
Money 
condition 
No delay 2 weeks 8 weeks Average M 
5 cents     
                M .41 .33 .36 .36 
               SD .34 .19 .20  
25 cents     
               M .42 .46 .35 .41 
               SD .27 .34 .31  















Means and Standard Deviations of Arcsine Transformed Proportion of Presses for Spins 
on a Slot Machine 
   Delay condition 
Money 
condition 
No delay 2 weeks 8 weeks Average M 
5 cents     
                M .71 .60 .62 .64 
               SD .1 .1 .1  
25 cents     
               M .68 .74 .63 .68 
               SD .1 .1 .1  
Average M .70 .72 .62  
